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1.  Introduction 
A phenomenon which has attracted considerable attention by researchers in child 
language is the interaction between quantifiers and negation. Much work on this 
topic starts from the findings documented by Musolino (1998). That study 
included a series of experiments investigating English-speaking children’s 
interpretation of sentences like the following. 
(1) Every horse didn’t jump over the fence 
(2) The detective didn’t find some guys 
(3) The detective didn’t find two guys 
Each of the sentences above contains two operators: negation and a quantified 
noun phrase. This yields two logically possible scope assignments for each 
sentence. To illustrate, (1) is ambiguous between the two interpretations listed 
below.
(4) Every horse is such that it did not jump over the fence 
"x [horse (x) #$ jump over the fence (x)] 
 ‘for every x, if x is a horse then x did not jump over the fence’ 
(5) Not every horse jumped over the fence 
$"x [horse (x) # jump over the fence (x)] 
‘it is not the case that for every x, if x is a horse then x jumped over the 
fence’
The two interpretations of (1) listed in (4) and (5) result from the relative scope 
assignment to negation and every, as suggested by the order of the operators $
and " in the logical formulae. In the semantic literature, the interpretation in (4) is 
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referred to as the ‘surface scope’ or ‘isomorphic’ interpretation of (1), while (5) is 
referred to as the ‘inverse scope’ or ‘non-isomorphic’ interpretation of (1). This is 
because in (4) the scope bearing elements every and not are interpreted in the 
same order with which they appear in the overt syntax, whereas in (5) they are 
interpreted in the opposite order. 
The research question that Musolino (1998) and others have addressed is 
whether young children are capable of accessing both the surface scope and the 
inverse scope interpretation of sentences containing negation and another scope-
bearing element. The experimental evidence collected by Musolino (1998) 
suggests that this is not the case. In fact, the evidence suggests that, for all the 
constructions in (1), (2) and (3), 4- and 5-year-old children consistently resort to 
their surface scope interpretations. This finding led Musolino (1998) to propose 
the Observation of Isomorphism, the claim that children’s semantic scope 
coincides with overt syntactic scope. 
 More recent studies have led to an important refinement of the picture 
suggested by Musolino’s findings. In particular, recent studies have shown that 
children’s interpretation of sentences like (1), (2) and (3) is affected by the 
context. For instance, Gualmini (2004) has shown that, in a context in which the 
Troll is expected to deliver all the relevant pizzas, children select the inverse 
scope interpretation of (6).
(6) The Troll didn’t deliver some pizzas 
In the same vein, Gualmini (2004) demonstrated that children are perfectly 
capable of assigning wide scope to the indefinite some with sentences such as (7),
and Gualmini (in press) has shown that the same is true for Italian-speaking 
children.
(7) Every farmer didn’t clean some animal 
Furthermore, Gualmini, Hacquard, Hulsey and Fox (2005) have recently shown 
that the same contextual maneuver discovered by Gualmini (2004) leads children 
to select the inverse scope interpretation of sentences comparable to (1) and (3) to 
a higher extent than observed in previous literature. Finally, Musolino and Lidz 
(2006) report that children select the inverse scope interpretation of (8) to a larger 
extent than they did for (1).
(8) Every horse jumped over the log, but every horse didn’t jump over the 
fence.
The finding that children’s behavior changes systematically across contexts poses 
a challenge for the original view of Isomorphism, especially since these studies 
focused on the exact same sentences which, according to Musolino, were 
predicted to be interpreted exclusively on their surface scope interpretation.  
Having established that children are capable of accessing inverse scope 
interpretations, however, the question remains whether surface scope 
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interpretations and inverse scope interpretations have equal status in child 
language. One view, proposed by Hulsey, Hacquard, Fox and Gualmini (2004) 
argues that children do not have any default preference for surface scope 
interpretations, but are rather guided by discourse relevance. A different view, 
proposed by Musolino and Lidz (2006), claims that surface scope interpretations 
are indeed special. On this view, children’s behavior follows from a preference 
for surface scope interpretations and a preference for true interpretations. In 
particular, the former factor is supposed to take precedence over the latter, in 
order to explain the fact that children often select false surface scope 
interpretations over true inverse scope interpretations.  
 An interesting aspect of the current debate is that the focus is on the 
interaction between negation and quantified noun phrases (but see Krämer 2000 
for an important exception). This is somewhat surprising, given that both accounts 
described above also make predictions for sentences containing other scope 
bearing elements. For example, it seems appropriate to expand the empirical basis 
of the debate by looking at children’s interpretation of sentences containing 
negation and a modal operator. This is exactly what we intend to do.  
2.  Modals and Negation across Languages 
In this section we introduce the relevant facts about sentences containing negation 
and a modal operator in adult English and adult Italian. Both languages present 
sentences which adults prefer to interpret on their inverse scope interpretation. To 
illustrate, consider the sentence below. 
(9) The lion cannot be in the same cage as the tiger 
As the morphology suggests, the verbal form cannot can be decomposed into the 
modal operator can (%) and negation (¬). Interestingly, these two scope-bearing 
elements are not interpreted according to the surface syntax. In other words, the 
preferred interpretation of (9) is the interpretation paraphrased in (10), whereas 
the interpretation paraphrased in (11) is largely dis-preferred, if at all available 
(10) It is not the case that the lion can be in the same cage as the tiger ¬ > %
(11) It is possible that the lion not be in the same cage as the tiger % > ¬ 
In Italian, we can express the logical equivalent of (10) both using the modal verb 
‘potere’ (%) and ‘dovere’ ( ) in combination with sentential negation. Due to the 
parametric difference in the position of negation, the latter choice gives rise to an 
inverse scope configuration where negation c-commands the modal verb in the 
overt syntax but it is interpreted within the scope of the modal operator. To 
illustrate, consider (12) and its two possible interpretations in (13) and (14): 
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(12) Il leone non deve stare nella stessa gabbia con la tigre 
 ‘The lion not must be in the same cage with the tiger’ 
(13) It is not the case that the lion must be in the tiger’s cage          ¬ > 
(14) It necessary that the lion not be in the tiger’s cage  > ¬ 
Interpretation (14), which is logically equivalent to (10), is the preferred 
interpretation of (12). It is interesting to observe that the differences between 
English and Italian regarding the choice of the modal auxiliary and the relative 
position of negation end up canceling each other out: (9) and (12) express the 
same proposition under their inverse scope interpretation. In fact, from the 
perspective of the syntax-semantics mapping, we observe that both languages 
make use of an inverse scope mapping to convey the proposition preferred by 
adults. Thus, the question is whether English- and Italian-speaking children can 
make use of the covert movement operation that is required by the adult 
interpretation of the relevant sentences.1
As we saw above, the view proposed by Musolino and Lidz (2006) claims 
that children’s behavior is ultimately dictated by two factors: a preference for 
surface scope interpretations and a preference for true interpretations. When it 
comes to sentences like (9) and (12), this amounts to claiming that children should 
interpret the relevant sentences on their surface scope interpretation, especially 
when the surface scope interpretation allows them to say ‘yes.’ To evaluate this 
claim, we turn to the laboratory. 
3.  Experimental Design 
In this section, we present the results of two experiments investigating children’s 
interpretation of sentences containing negation and a modal operator.  
3.1.  Experiment I 
In this section we report the results of an experiment with English-speaking 
children. The purpose of the experiment is to investigate how children interpret 
sentences containing the modal form cannot. Recall (9), and its logically possible 
readings in (10) and (11), repeated below. 
(9) The lion cannot be in the same cage as the tiger 
(10) It is not the case that the lion can be in the same cage as the tiger ¬ > %
(11)  It is possible that the lion not be in the same cage as the tiger % > ¬ 
1In this paper we assume that it is the negative operator which covertly moves in order to 
generate the inverse scope readings (Moscati 2006, 2007). However, nothing changes if one 
considers the auxiliary as the element which undergoes covert movement. 
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The experiment took the form of questions after stories. First, children were 
presented with the instruction in (9) in the context of a story. In the story, children 
were told that Dora was working at the zoo. At the zoo, there were two cages, one 
cage containing a tiger and one cage containing a giraffe. Dora’s job was to put 
two other animals into the cages, a hippo and a lion, and the instruction she had 
received was (9). During the experiment, we told children that Dora had forgotten 
what the instructions were and that she would ask them for some help. Then Dora 
asked children the pre-test question in (15) and then the question in (16).
(15) Can I put the hippo with the tiger? 
(16) Can I put the lion with the tiger? 
Let us spell out the reason for the pre-test question. If children interpret the target 
sentence on its inverse scope interpretation (10), then they know that in the actual 
world the lion should not be in the same cage as the tiger. However, if they 
interpret the target sentence on its surface scope interpretation (11), then they 
know that it is possible for the lion not to be in the same cage as the tiger, but this 
is compatible both with a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ answer to (16). Thus, the surface scope 
interpretation of (9) under-determines whether the lion could be placed with the 
tiger in the actual world. The problem is that we do not know how children 
respond to questions that are under-determined by their state of knowledge. 
However, given that the inverse scope interpretation of the target instruction is 
associated with a ‘no’ answer to the question, it is essential that the surface scope 
interpretation be associated with a ‘yes’ answer. In short, it is important to ensure 
that children say ‘yes,’ when they are presented with an under-determined 
question. This is the reason for the question in (15). If a child answers ‘yes’ to 
(15), then we can assume that that child will answer ‘yes’ to an under-determined 
question. By contrast, if a child answers ‘no’ to a question like (15), then we can’t 
assume that that child would answer affirmatively to a question, when both the 
affirmative answer and the negative answer are compatible with his state of 
knowledge. In this case, it would be appropriate to exclude that trial from the 
experiment. 
Let us now turn to the results. 15 English-speaking children (age 4;0 – 5;5, 
mean 4;9) participated in the experiment. Each child was presented with 4 
questions like (15). Out of the resulting 60 questions, children answered ‘yes’ 47 
times (78.3%). On those trials, children were than asked questions like (16), and 
out of those 47 trials said ‘no’ 43 times (91.4%).2 In other words, children who 
respond ‘yes’ to under-determined questions, respond ‘no’ the question in (16).
We interpret this result as suggesting that children do not treat (16) as an under-
determined question. In fact, if children interpreted (9) on its surface scope 
interpretation, their state of knowledge would warrant both an affirmative answer 
and a negative answer to the question in (16). Thus, children would be expected to 
2If we consider also the trials on which children had failed the pre-test, the numbers don’t 
change: children answered ‘no’ to (16) 55 times out 60 (91.6%). 
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answer ‘yes,’ just like in the case of questions like (15). This is not what 
happened, however. Children have constructed an interpretation of the instruction 
in (9) that leads them to give a negative answer to the question in (16), and that 
interpretation is the same inverse scope interpretation that adults would select. 
Crucially, the experimental results do not seem to be epiphenomenal on the 
choice of modal or on the position of negation in English since a variation of 
those factors doesn’t affect the interpretation of the sentence, as we will see in the 
next experiment. 
3.2.  Experiment II 
A second experiment was conducted with Italian-speaking children in order to 
evaluate whether the results obtained in English are due to some special property 
of the English modal system but they reflect a genuine property of early grammar: 
the possibility of accessing inverse scope readings with modal auxiliaries and 
negation. We told 17 Italian-speaking children (age 4;5 – 6;0, mean 5;3) 4 stories 
similar to the ones in Experiment I. But this time, during each story, the character 
received an instruction containing the modal verb dovere ‘must’ instead of potere
‘can.’ In one story, analogous to the one previously illustrated, Dora received the 
following instruction: 
(12)      Il leone non deve stare nella stessa gabbia con la tigre 
 ‘The lion not must be in the same cage with the tiger’ 
(13)     It is not the case that the lion must be in the tiger’s cage         ¬ > 
(14)     It is necessary that the lion not be in the tiger’s cage  > ¬ 
Recall that a possible reading for sentence (12) is given in (14) and that it 
expresses the same meaning of the English sentence (9), namely the impossibility 
for the lion to be together with the tiger. Given that the two sentences are truth-
conditionally equivalent under their inverse scope reading and that the story- 
context has been left unchanged, we can use the same pre-test and test question 
used in Experiment I:  
(17) L’ippopotamo può stare nella gabbia della tigre? 
‘Can the hippo be in the tiger’s cage?’ 
(18) Il leone può stare nella gabbia con la tigre? 
            ‘Can the lion be in the tiger’s cage?’ 
The results are that Italian children answered ‘yes’ to the pre-test question 59 
times out of 68 (86.7%) and among those trials, like their English-speaking peers, 
they also answered ‘no’ 52 times out of 56 (93.2%) to the test question (e.g., 
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(18).3 As Table 1 shows, the results obtained from Italian-speaking children are 










Table 1. Affirmative answers of Italian- and English-speaking children to the pre-
test and test questions. 
Looking at Table 1, first we observe that no difference is found regarding the rate 
of affirmative answers to the contextually underspecified question asked in the 
pre-test condition and that both Italian- and English-speaking children answer 
‘yes’ when the context allows them to do so. Second, and more interestingly, both 
populations of children give a negative answer to the test question, regardless of 
the differences in the modal used and in the position of negation in the instruction. 
These results strongly suggest that the variation of these two factors doesn’t have 
any effect on the computation of the truth-conditions of the target sentences (9) 
and (12) and that surface c-command does not dictate the semantic interpretation.  
We would like to end with a comment on one difference between Italian-
speaking children and Italian-speaking adults, which we must leave for future 
research. It has to be noticed that, while in English the inverse scope reading 
appears to be the only possible - or strongly favored - option, in adult Italian the 
surface scope reading is also possible. This means that whatever mechanism rules 
out the surface scope interpretation in English is not active in Italian. 
Nevertheless, the inverse scope reading was preferred by the Italian-speaking 
children in Experiment II, suggesting that the preference for the inverse scope 
reading is not determined by some special (i.e. polarity) property of the modal 
can.
3The answers of one child were discarded. This child answered 3 times 'yes' to the target 
question but when she was asked for explanations she answered by saying 'I say yes even if it was 
stated that the lion cannot.’ This follow up suggested that she interpreted the target sentence under 
the inverse scope reading. Being the answers and the motivation in contrast, we decided to exclude 
those answers from the count. 
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4.  Conclusion 
Let us sum up. In this paper, we addressed the current debate on children’s 
interpretation of scopally ambiguous sentences by considering sentences 
containing negation and modal operators. The results show that English- and 
Italian-speaking children interpret (9) on its inverse scope interpretation. This 
finding poses a challenge to the view defended by Musolino and Lidz (2006), 
which derives children’s behavior from a putative preference for surface scope 
from children’s failure to re-analyze.  
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